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Exploitation, Commodification, and Equality 
Anne Phillips
1
  
 
In a recent article on global surrogacy, Vida Panitch takes up the challenge of identifying 
what is exploitative in the global trade in reproductive services.
 
In particular, she examines 
what is exploitative about the reliance on countries like India, where solutions to the 
infertility problems of wealthier couples are met by women who are poorer ‘both relatively 
and absolutely than surrogates in the USA’. 2 India has been known, for some time, as the 
transnational hub for the global trade in surrogacy, to the point, indeed, where its reputation 
began to embarrass the government: in 2012, same-sex couples were banned from using 
India’s surrogacy services; in 2015, the government announced that clinics could no longer 
accept clients who were resident outside the country.  The effect of the latter announcement 
remains to be seen, but for the moment, Panitch’s argument is still pertinent. Surrogates in 
India are paid much less than their counterparts in wealthier countries; they are also subjected 
to tighter bodily surveillance, often including having to live for the duration of the pregnancy 
in highly regulated hostels attached to the infertility clinics.
3
 Under Indian legislation, they 
have no right to change their mind about relinquishing the child (or children) after the birth. 
Reported payments range between $1,500 and $10,000 per pregnancy, though averaging 
around $3,000. This is both considerably less than the total price paid by the clinics’ clients 
(closer to $50,000), and considerably less than the $25,000 to $40,000 typically paid to US 
surrogates. (Clients in the US are likely to pay $100,000 in total). In these circumstances, we 
might feel agnostic about whether US surrogates are exploited, but pretty clear that Indian 
surrogates are. If the fairness of an arrangement is at least partly judged by reference to what 
people in other parts of the world receive for a service (Panitch argues that it is), then Indian 
surrogates are significantly underpaid. If we compare, moreover, the relative capacity of 
women in India and those in the US to negotiate better terms, the former are at a serious 
disadvantage. If the potential Indian surrogate attempts to bargain, ‘the offer will just be 
made to someone who will not.’4 By criteria of both justice and consent, Panitch  argues, 
these women are exploited.  
In defending her claim of exploitation, she addresses objections that have come out of 
a number of ethnographically informed studies of the Indian surrogacy industry, which 
mostly refuse the normative question (‘what, if anything, is wrong with commercial 
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surrogacy?’) to focus on the experience of women’s lives as revealed through their own 
narratives. Amrita Pande, one of the leading figures in this move, has said that ‘where 
surrogacy work is rapidly becoming a survival strategy for many women, it makes little 
analytical sense to battle about the morality of surrogacy’.5 ‘The market for wombs is not 
good or evil. It simply exists.’6 From this perspective, the preoccupation with ethical 
judgement – and presumption that there is a universal standpoint from which to make such 
judgements –has been said to reflect a Western ‘occidentalising’ gaze.7 It imports the 
confidence of its ethical assumptions without bothering to engage with how the practice is 
experienced and lived, or what would happen to the women if it were banned.  
Panitch is sympathetic to these objections, but addresses them by drawing a firm line 
between what she calls the commodification and the exploitation view. On her account, the 
moralising that the ethnographers object to is mainly associated with the first of these: with 
the view, that is, that in selling one’s reproductive services, one is making a commodity of 
something that should not be regarded as such, ‘reduc(ing) a human agent to the dollar value 
of her body parts’, and engaging in a sale that is, in some important sense, the sale of a self.8 
It was this critique, she claims, that underpinned the arguments of those Western feminists 
who wrote about surrogacy in the wake of the notorious Baby M case, and she cites Elizabeth 
Anderson, Christine Overall, Carole Pateman and Mary Warnock as examples. The same 
kind of moralising, however, does not bedevil the exploitation critique. ‘We can deny the 
commodification view and still make an exploitation claim.’9 Both critiques clearly involve 
claims of moral harm, but it is only the first, she argues, that treats the findings of 
ethnographic studies as irrelevant, proceeding by way of a ‘purely conceptual, and indeed 
conceptually Western, analysis of agency, value, and self’. 10 The second takes seriously the 
views of the Indian surrogates about their own lives, and grounds its analysis of exploitation 
in their accounts of feeling disposable and lacking bargaining power.  
Part of the appeal of this distinction is that it promises to disentangle what can be very 
different reasons for worrying about the development of commercial surrogacy. In the 
process, it should help clarify whether objections refer to the specific conditions under which 
surrogacy is practiced (excessively low pay to surrogates, intrusive regulation of the body, 
coercive background conditions), or to the practice per se. It then parallels arguments that 
have been made as regards the permissibility of markets in live human organs. In one 
illustration, Charles Erin and John Harris have suggested that the main concern underlying 
popular resistance to markets in human kidneys, stem cells, or gametes is the perception that 
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the rich buy while the poor and desperate sell. But what if the only organisation licensed to 
purchase this material were something like the UK’s National Health Service? What if organs 
were allocated to patients, not on the basis of purchasing power, but strictly according to 
medical need? What if the purchasing zone were restricted to neighbouring countries with 
comparable income levels so as to reduce the prospect of people in rich countries preying on 
those in poor?
11
 With these conditions in place, they argue, it would no longer make much 
sense to talk of exploitation, and the ethical objections would fall.  
If one regards commodification as the problem, this kind of reform provides no 
solution, but if exploitation is the problem, we can look to changes in conditions that will 
make the exchanges non-exploitative. As regards commercial surrogacy, this would suggest 
focusing attention on conditions in the more overtly problematic Indian industry, where it is 
pretty clear to most observers that there is room for reform, rather than continuing to question 
the legitimacy of the equivalent industry in the USA. The typical surrogates in the US are 
working class, but they are not the poorest of the poor: apart from anything else, fertility 
clinics will not recruit women who are on welfare benefits. Though they take up surrogacy 
for reasons similar to their Indian counterparts (to raise money to build a house, pay off a 
debt, or finance a child through education), studies rarely indicate them as ‘driven’ by 
economic necessity. Relationships with commissioning parents are generally good, and in a 
range of empirical studies carried out in recent years, few of the women who have acted as 
surrogates report difficulties in relinquishing the baby after birth.
12
 Given some of the 
alternatives available in the US economy, working conditions for surrogates are reasonably 
good. The language of exploitation certainly strikes an odd note as applied to the woman who 
gave birth to two children for Elton John and David Furnish, who continues to see the couple 
and their children in a seemingly amicable arrangement, and who was (presumably) well paid 
for her reproductive services. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Baby M case, it was the enforceability of surrogacy 
contracts that was the sticking point for most feminist commentators. The weight of feminist 
opinion was against commercial surrogacy, though there was always a significant minority 
(this may now be a majority) who were swayed by arguments about women having the right 
to do as they chose with their own bodies, or thought it inconsistent to treat the exchange of 
money for reproductive services as significantly different from the exchange of money for 
any other bodily service.  Some further argued that it was an insult to women’s rational 
capacities to suggest that they could not make enforceable contracts about the use of their 
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bodies,
13
 but mostly, this was a step too far even for those torn between competing 
arguments.
14
 The idea of holding a woman to a contract undertaken before the pregnancy 
began was felt to ignore the nature and intensity of the experience, and to treat the pregnant 
woman, not as a person in a relationship to a growing foetus/ baby, but as the container for 
someone else’s child. It was this, rather than claims about exploitation, that most dominated 
discussion. This does indeed sound closer to a commodification critique.  
Since then, surrogacy has been increasingly normalised in the US, amidst neo-liberal 
celebrations of market rationality and individual choice that make it seem terribly old-
fashioned to object. The vast majority of arrangements no longer use the eggs of the 
surrogate, thereby breaking the genetic connection that had been an important component in 
the Baby M case. The language of exploitation suggests a comparison between the ordinarily 
troublesome and the exploitative unfair (not everything we dislike about our work counts as 
exploitation), and on most comparisons, working as a surrogate in the US looks a relatively 
favourable way to earn one’s living. Meanwhile, the language of commodification can sound 
absurdly exaggerated in a world where pretty much everything has been commodified. 
Perhaps, as Panitch suggests, we should focus on what it is about conditions in the 
transnational surrogacy trade that might justify the term exploitation, rather than continuing 
with moralistic claims about how terrible it is to be ‘selling oneself’? 
I have written previously about commercial surrogacy, in the context of a critique of 
underlying models of self and body ownership that help legitimate markets in bodily services 
and body parts.
15
 I argued there that treating labour simply as property normalises what 
remains a power relation, and that argument continues to inform the arguments in this essay. 
But I want now to take a different tack, I want to challenge the now commonly invoked 
distinction between exploitation and commodification critiques (a distinction almost always 
introduced to diminish the power of the second); and argue that it is not so easy to separate 
out these two, because both are closely aligned to notions of equality. I take issue with the 
suggestion that commodification critiques deal in absolutes while exploitation critiques deal 
in continuums, and argue that both involve a point at which the ordinarily troubling turns into 
the seriously problematic. Both, that is, acknowledge a range running from the more benign 
to the thoroughly unacceptable, and both draw on intuitions about what it is to treat others as 
equals in their assessments of when that line has been crossed. The standard we implicitly 
apply in making that distinction is, I claim, a standard of what we normally owe to those we 
regard as our equals. If so, it is not so easy to sustain a contrast between exploitation and 
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commodification, for elements of both are implicated in the critique.  I end with an argument 
that relocates the debate about commercial surrogacy away from the individuals participating 
in it to the more systemic level. As well as asking whether X is being exploited or Y is being 
commodified, we need to consider the implications of commercial surrogacy for relations of 
equality as a whole.  
Is Commodification More ‘Absolutist’ Than Exploitation? 
I start with the suggestion that an exploitation critique is to be preferred to a commodification 
critique because it is less inherently moralised. The contrast represents commodification 
critiques as absolutist, independent of context, unresponsive to conditions, and unresponsive 
to the participants’ perceptions of these conditions. For a commodification critic, we are told, 
there are just certain categories of thing or being that should not be for sale. Now, it is true 
that a commodification critique does often involve a substantive claim about inherent value, 
which then provides the dividing line from other things or beings or activities that can more 
legitimately be bought and sold. We don’t (nowadays) think it legitimate to buy and sell 
people, though most still think it legitimate to buy and sell animals. This suggests a 
distinction between the inherent value of human and non-human animals. We don’t think of 
love as something that can be bought and sold, though many are quite happy to buy sex; this 
too seems to rely on a distinction between love and sex.  For the followers of Henry George, 
it was land that should not be commodified, and while George himself was too much of a 
realist to think we could stop people treating the land as a commodity, he argued that any 
increases in its ‘value’ should be returned to all of us in the form of a land tax. For many 
indigenous peoples, the land has spiritual as well as productive significance, and for this 
reason cannot be treated as a commodity.  
 I accept, then, that there is a category of commodification critique that takes a more 
absolutist form, and regards it as inherent in the nature of X that it either cannot or must not 
be traded. The charge is less convincing, however, when applied to those who have explored 
the commodification of bodily services, including the development of commercial surrogacy. 
Much of this literature starts from the corporeal nature of all work, and is then very much 
alive to the difficulties of employing ‘the body’ to distinguish what can and cannot be sold. 
There is no employment on earth that does not, in some sense, require us to put our bodies to 
the service of our employers, nothing so entirely cerebral that we can do it without bringing 
our body along, and there are many occupations in which the body is not just incidental but 
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almost the entire point.
16
 If we were to argue that there is something about the body that 
makes it ethically unacceptable to take payment for bodily services, we would have to rule 
out a good deal more than commercial surrogacy. The point I would stress is that most people 
who write about the commodification of body parts or bodily services are well aware of this 
continuum, and do not just wade in with highly moralised assertions about what should or 
should not be allowed.  
In her critique of surrogacy contracts, for example, Carole Pateman quite explicitly 
associates these with ‘other’ wage contracts, all of which, in her analysis, involve some level 
of personal subordination, and all of which involve a subordination that is experienced 
through the body. Her analysis is framed by an understanding of persons as embodied and of 
labour as embodied labour.
17
 Whatever it is that distinguishes commercial surrogacy from 
being a professional athlete or a miner or an office worker, it cannot be said that in surrogacy 
we are paid for the use of our bodies. What can be said, more plausibly, is that surrogacy is 
an ‘extreme example’ of the corporeality of all work, one in which (to quote here Amrita 
Pande)  ‘the body of the worker is the fundamental and ultimate site, resource, requirement, 
and (arguably) product’.18 In this framing, surrogacy occupies the extreme edges of a 
continuum that in its lesser forms we barely even notice. Pateman has sometimes been held to 
account – including by Pande -  for her suggestion that a woman’s reproductive labour is 
‘more integral’ to her identity than other kinds of labour,19 but the notion of a continuum, in 
which some forms of labour are more expressive of who we are than others, strikes me as 
relatively uncontroversial.  It would be contentious, certainly, to claim that what is most 
integral to female identity is the same for all women; but a more modest claim about some 
forms of labour being more integral to identity than others, and some forms of employment 
therefore experienced as more controlling and intrusive than others, goes almost without 
saying. 
In her critique of commodification, Margaret Radin also rejects a compartmentalised 
approach that seeks to divide up the social world into things that can be marketised and those 
that should be off limits. She criticises what she terms universal commodification, and argues 
that ‘systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is threatening to 
personhood because it detaches from the person that which is integral to the person’.20 But 
she does not think we can address this, as it plays out, for example, in the sale of sexual and 
reproductive services, simply by banning particular kinds of market. In her argument, there 
are many things we quite normally and happily think of as marketable commodities – houses, 
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cars, and wedding rings figure among her examples – that simultaneously have important 
non-market significance to our lives. What we need is not so much a separation of the world 
into those things that can be bought and sold and those that must not, but regulatory measures 
(in pretty much all markets) that block the possibility of full commodification, and keep alive 
a more humane vision of the significance goods and activities have for people.   
 There is, in other words, much more of a continuum in Radin’s and Pateman’s 
arguments (and, I think, my own) than one might associate with a commodification critique, 
and on this score, less to choose between the exploitation and commodification arguments. In 
exploitation critiques, the continuum is more self-evident, for in most usages, the focus is on 
differentiating between the fair and the exploitative, with the assumption that the majority of 
market transactions escape the latter label. 
21
 When people charge that working conditions in 
clothing factories in Bangladesh are exploitative, they recognise many common features with 
conditions in Birmingham or Bristol, but claim that in some respect or other, the conditions in 
the Bangladesh factory have crossed the line. So while Robert Goodin is probably right when 
he says that exploitation is not a scalar notion –‘people are either exploited or they are not’22 
–we typically employ the term when examining a range of broadly similar situations and 
transactions, some of which, in our assessment, are to be deemed exploitative. The point is 
that both commodification and exploitation critiques grapple with continuums rather than 
absolutes, that both lend themselves to degrees (a practice can be more or less exploitative, a 
commodification can be full or partial), and that within this continuum, both involve some 
notion of crossing a line. 
Crossing the Line: What Counts as a Reasonable Deal? 
What provides the basis for this?  Most of those writing on exploitation agree that you can be 
exploited and yet  better off materially than you would otherwise have been, so it does not 
appear that this is the crucial divide. Indeed it can often be said that the person being 
exploited gains more from the deal than the person exploiting.  As Allen Wood has put it, 
‘someone who is propertyless and starving has a lot to gain by striking a deal with an 
employer who is willing to offer bare subsistence in exchange for long, hard labour under 
dangerous conditions – and a lot to lose (namely, life itself) if no such exploitative bargain is 
in the offing.’23 With commercial surrogacy, the gain to the surrogate may be the life of a 
sick child whose medical costs will be covered by the payment, and once we put that into the 
balance, we might well say that the ‘exploited’ gains more than the ‘exploiter’. We cannot 
8 
 
identify exploitation just by counting up the respective costs and benefits of the parties to the 
agreement; a fortiori, we cannot identify commodification in this way.
24
   
There is also increasingly a consensus that one cannot identify exploitation simply 
through the existence or otherwise of consent: a recognition, that is, that one can be exploited 
in an arrangement to which one has given one’s informed consent; and a queasiness about 
defining ‘free consent’ so strictly that any amount of economic or emotional pressure turns it 
into coercion.
25
 So far as employment is concerned, most of us do things we would prefer not 
to do because we have to pay the bills. If this were to count as coercion, it covers too large a 
swathe of our working lives. We also do many things we would not otherwise choose to do 
because we fear losing face or losing friends or losing love. Again, if this were to count as 
coercion, it covers too much of human life. Anyone not on a desert island is continually 
pressured by the needs and emotions of others, and some of this pressure may well be unfair, 
if, for example, it fails to take account of our own needs and vulnerabilities. But feeling 
unfairly pressured is not the same as losing the capacity to say ‘no’, so what is the point at 
which we might want to say we are being exploited? 
 One of the compelling contributions Alan Wertheimer has made to our understanding 
of exploitation is his distinction between taking advantage of unfairness and taking unfair 
advantage (of unfairness). 
26
 In this framing, it is not necessarily exploitative to take 
advantage of other people’s relative poverty to persuade them to agree to a transaction they 
would prefer to avoid. The exploitation comes in (the line is crossed) at the point where 
‘particular defects’ in decision-making capacities lead people to agree to a transaction 
without fully realising what a bad deal it is, or ‘special vulnerabilities’ in their situation lead 
them to accept a much lower payment than would otherwise have been the case. There is 
plenty of unfairness around, but not all of it is exploitation. We arguably take advantage of 
(social) unfairness and (individual) vulnerabilities whenever we pay someone less than we 
earn to do a job both we and they would prefer not to do. When I pay someone to clean my 
house, I take advantage of a socially validated pay scale that I personally regard as unfair. I 
also take advantage of the individual vulnerability of the cleaner, who has fewer educational 
qualifications and limited alternative ways of making a living. As I read Wertheimer, it is 
when I take additional advantage of that unfairness and vulnerability to pay her below a 
living wage that I exploit her. To apply this to surrogacy, whatever US surrogates might 
claim about the pleasure they take in giving ‘the gift of life’ (this being the favoured 
discourse of the recruiting agencies), they would not offer their services if they earnt as much 
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as the commissioning clients. But while their choice of occupation reflects income 
inequalities that we or they might think generally unfair, that need not make it exploitation. In 
the case of the Indian surrogates, by contrast, if the urgency of their needs means they cannot 
even begin to negotiate their terms of employment, we might want to say (with Panitch) that 
the agencies are taking not just advantage, but unfair advantage.  
The question remains: how and on what basis are we drawing this line?  There are two 
main offerings in the existing literature: either some version of a ‘fair price’, usually a 
derivative of existing market prices; or some version of fair conditions of negotiation, a 
derivative of reasonably equitable rather than ideal equality between the negotiators. 
Wertheimer finds the relevant criterion in the first of these– in a hypothetical market price. 
This is a market price, but hypothetical, because if there is some constraint on competition, it 
might be higher than we find in existing markets; and it is a test of normality rather than an 
ideal of fairness, the ‘price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage of particular 
defects in the other party’s decision-making capacity or special vulnerabilities in the other 
party’s situation.’27 Note that the argument depends on some rough consensus about what is 
normal. It therefore works reasonably well with my cleaner example. Lots of people work as 
cleaners, in both public and private employment, and this gives us some idea of the ‘normal’ 
range of pay. Lots of people employ cleaners, and therefore have to grapple with questions of 
what counts as fair payment. Apart therefore from those who think it per se exploitative to 
pay someone else to clear up our mess after us, we can mostly make sense, in this context, of 
a distinction between taking advantage of unfairness and taking unfair advantage of 
unfairness. None of us can single-handedly solve all the inequalities of distribution, but we 
can try to pay what, within general conditions of inequality and arguably unfairness, is a 
‘fair’ price.   
The hypothetical market price works less well with body trades. First, where body 
trades have been subject to legal restrictions or bans, there is no globally competitive market 
to suggest the fair price. There is not even a nationally competitive one, for the work may be 
associated with levels of stigma that significantly affect the supply. From Pande’s work on 
India, for example, we know that the stigma attached to surrogacy leads many to conceal 
their work from their neighbours, and sometimes from their children. (In the latter case, they 
then have to avoid seeing their children for the duration of the pregnancy.) Even with the 
payment set at ten times the median monthly income, the demand for surrogates is now 
higher than the supply. In the classic cases discussed in the exploitation literature – the person 
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who exploits your desperation for a cooling drink on a hot day, or your desperation for a lift 
when stranded on top of a mountain pass – the  lack of competition means you end up paying 
a grossly inflated price for the commodity or service. If one were to transpose this model to 
the payment for surrogacy services, one might have to say that the supply of surrogates has 
been artificially held down by legal restrictions and social stigmas, leading to a market price 
that is inappropriately high.  This does not seem right. 
The above points to a problem with hypothetical prices in transactions where the 
commodification is recent and still highly contested. We could perhaps use payment rates in 
other countries to establish the hypothetical market price, by which measure we might 
conclude that US surrogates are overpaid and Indian ones underpaid. Panitch argues that we 
can think of exploitation ‘not only within but across contracts’,28 and that cross country 
comparisons are relevant in identifying exploitation, and this fits with many common-sense 
views about the exploitative nature of contracts in factories in low-wage countries.  But 
precisely what ‘price’ one derives from this remains unclear. Realistically, the Indian 
surrogacy industry will only continue to attract business if it operates by a minimum wage 
considerably lower than that in the USA (this is the classic dilemma as regards improving 
conditions in low wage economies), but also, as Panitch argues, if the wages for surrogacy in 
India were set by US standards they could become almost impossible to refuse.
29
  The 
industry would then be doing better on her justice condition – ending under-payment – but 
much worse on her consent condition. We could perhaps establish the ‘fair’ price by tracking 
the wages paid to workers with comparable levels of skill and hours of work. But here too, 
comparability on what axis? If we think of pregnancy as working 24 hours a day, seven days 
a week, for a total of nine months, then even by the standards of the low wages otherwise 
paid to women in rural India, $3,000 looks very much like taking unfair advantage of 
unfairness.  If we think, instead, of pregnancy as a state of being for nine months, with 
variable discomfort over that period and some very hard labour at the end, the price might 
begin to look relatively favourable:. We might still say it is taking advantage of global 
unfairness, but not itself exploitative. If, as a third alternative, we think of pregnancy as 
giving up your normal existence for nine months –as it increasingly means in India’s 
surrogacy trade - it is hard to know what price to put on it. We seem to have moved into the 
realm of putting a price on life.  
It is hard, that is, to mobilise a notion of fair payment as regards commercial 
surrogacy services. A potentially more promising way of identifying what counts as a 
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reasonable, non-exploitative deal is to focus on conditions of employment and conditions of 
empowerment: some version, that is, of fair conditions of negotiation. This is more central to 
Panitch’s recommendations, and also figures in Jeffrey Kirby’s discussion of exploitation in 
the transnational surrogacy trade.
30
  Kirby recommends a process of recruitment that enables 
women to make fully-informed decisions about whether to become a surrogate, aided by 
advocate-navigators with no vested interest in whether they sign up; enhanced protection 
against harm, including protocols about hormone injections and the number of embryos 
transferred, and guarantees of counselling and health care; and participatory engagement of 
core stakeholders in decisions about terms and conditions. Panitch recommends a state 
enforced standard contract, with minimum wage guarantees, legal representation, housing, 
health, and leave standards, and opt-out clauses; and a tax on surrogacy revenue to fund 
initiatives for female empowerment.  She regards the first only as interim measures, because 
the main burden of her argument is that Indian surrogates need to be empowered to negotiate 
their own terms with the brokers and clients – to decide for themselves what counts as a 
reasonable deal –since what makes their current conditions exploitative is that they are not 
yet in a position to do so. ‘The genuine acceptance of an offer…depends on the ability to 
negotiate its terms. Authoritative consent is possible only where one is able to consent to the 
terms of the offer, and consenting to the terms of an offer depends on the ability to bargain 
for preferable terms.’31 I am not entirely convinced by this formulation, for focusing on 
consent tends either to understate the agency of those living in unfavourable conditions 
(suggesting they did not really mean it, or did not really understand the offer), or else gives 
the impression that anything we have consented to is thereby legitimate. Focusing on 
conditions of empowerment has the advantage, however, of turning attention to what I regard 
as the central issue: whether the transaction recognises or denies the status of the parties as 
equals.  
Exploitation, Commodification, and Inequality 
If my account of social justice leads to me to think the current distribution of income and 
power is unfair, what is that extra that leads me to mark some sub-set of the distribution as 
exploitative? My claim is that when we assess an arrangement as exploitative, we are 
mobilising our perceptions of whether what is being asked of others, or paid to them for their 
services, would be acceptable to us under similar circumstances.
32
 When the transaction is a 
market one, that perception of what is acceptable will be informed by market prices, but in all 
cases, is also informed by a sense of what it is to treat another as an equal. I do not present 
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this as an objective measure, for the meaning attached to ‘treating others as equals’ shifts 
through time, varies between societies, and can indeed vary significantly from one individual 
to another.  The very idea that others should be treated as equals is itself a recent 
phenomenon, associated with the American Declaration of Independence (1776) - ‘we hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal’ – or the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789)  - ‘men are born and remain free and equal in 
rights’ – and was self-evidently limited even in those bold announcements to exclude at least 
half the human race.  The subsequent extensions of the that equality, to include freed slaves, 
women, non-citizens, were achieved only through lengthy contestations; and it is worth 
recalling that, even in 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights finally 
abandoned the restrictive language of men to declare that ‘all human beings are born with 
equal and inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms’, the rights and equality were still not 
extended to colonial subjects.  
That all humans should be regarded as equals is a recent and fragile achievement, and 
the actual content we give to that equality remains deeply contested. Some would say that it 
implies complete equality in income and wealth; others that it has no material implications, 
and yet others that it sets determinate limits to the permissible social and economic 
inequalities. These are not matters that can be settled by fiat or logic. The content of equality 
can only be filled through argument and contestation; it is not and cannot be ‘self-evident’. I 
am not, then, claiming some objective measure of what it is to treat others as equals. My 
argument is only that our sense of what it is to behave to others on a basis of equality helps 
set the floor to what we regard as acceptable treatment. It helps establish that point at which 
an ordinary ‘taking advantage of’ slides into something exploitative.  
Exploitation is very much about inequality, and not just inequality in bargaining 
power or inequality in outcomes, but the inequality that is at stake when one party to an 
arrangement treats the other as a being of lesser significance. In a paradigm case of 
economic exploitation, where I  pay you at a level that makes it impossible for you to live 
what I would regard as a decent existence, I am treating you as a lesser being, with lesser 
needs and sensibilities than myself. Yet if I were your neighbour, living at the same 
subsistence level, the pitiful hourly wage I pay you for fixing my roof would not so obviously 
be exploitative. In my view, this is because I would not then be treating you any differently 
from the way I treat myself. It is not the level of payment that makes it exploitation (how 
closely, for example, it tracks the hypothetical market price), nor even what it tells us about 
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your capacity to refuse the deal, but what it asserts about our status as equals. In a paradigm 
case of inter-personal exploitation, where I exploit your emotional dependency on me to get 
you to put up with my bad temper, sneering manner, and endless affairs, I treat you with 
contempt, as someone of no standing, someone whose needs and feelings can be ignored. If 
we were reciprocally unpleasant to one another, with no obvious inequality of standing, this 
would be a disastrous relationship but, again, not so obviously exploitative.  The irrelevance 
of exploitation in these cases of mutual vulnerability helps highlight what is at stake. In 
exploring when the ordinarily unfair treatment of the vulnerable becomes the exploitative 
unfair, my claim is that this is the point where it crosses our equality line. Our views about 
what constitutes a fair price, or what counts as fair conditions of consent, reflect our views 
about what it is to treat another as an equal.
33
  
One implication is that exploitation and commodification begin to merge into one 
another, to the point where neither alone fully captures what is at stake. Consider here the 
scenes in Nepal during the 2015 earthquakes that killed an estimated 8500 people and 
destroyed much of Kathmandu. While rescue teams were rushing around trying to save lives 
and provide makeshift shelter, babies born to surrogates in Nepal were also being rescued, 
and flown to the safety of their new homes in Israel. Surrogacy has long been legal in Israel, 
but practised under strict government regulation, including a requirement that the surrogates 
are Jewish, married, and have had at least one child. Potential clients are also strictly 
regulated, and at this point in time, gay male couples were not permitted to employ 
surrogates. India had become the favoured alternative destination, but this door was closed by 
the 2012 restriction of surrogacy to married heterosexual couples, and the trade then moved 
to Nepal instead.
34
 At the time of the earthquakes, there were thirty or so newly born babies 
awaiting transfer to Israel, as well as a hundred or so, mostly Indian, surrogates still awaiting 
birth.
35
 The unease generated by pictures of babies flown out of an earthquake zone to scenes 
of celebration in Tel Aviv resonates with what Judith Butler has explored in her notion of a 
‘grievable life’:36 a sense that some lives are precious and countable (in this case, the babies 
and their future parents) whilst others are treated as negligible, of no great concern. The 
conditions that lead Vida Panitch to talk of exploitation in the surrogacy industry  – Nepal as 
a cut-price destination, the surrogates as in a weak position to bargain better terms -  certainly 
contribute to this sense of unease, but do not entirely explain it. There is also a powerful 
sense of a differential weight being given to different human beings. Borrowing more from 
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the commodification lexicon, there is a sense that some people’s bodies are being valued 
primarily as a means to meet the needs of the more significant others.
37
   
The additional twist as regard commercial surrogacy is that it is only women’s bodies 
that can be deployed in this way. One cannot plausibly represent surrogacy as a practice in 
which women are exploited by men, for the clients are still mostly heterosexual couples, and   
the agencies are often run by women, but if one thinks of the practice in terms of the weight it 
gives to different bodies, the fact that only women can be surrogates assumes particular 
significance. In her analysis of surrogacy, Debra Satz argues that ‘contract pregnancy places 
women’s bodies under the control of others and serves to perpetuate gender inequality’.38 As 
this suggests, it is not just that some people ’s bodies are being valued primarily as a means to 
meet the needs of more significant others; it is that only women’s bodies can perform this 
function. The practice positions women, and of necessity only women, as tools for satisfying 
the needs of others.  
At this point, it becomes hard to disentangle the exploitation from the 
commodification critique. The unease we may feel about the practices of global commercial 
surrogacy shares with the first a concern with fair prices and defensible conditions of 
employment, but it shares with the second a concern that some people (some women) have 
become the means of resolving the problems of the (by implication, more important) others, 
in a non-reversible relationship that underscores their inequality. That the women fall out of 
the picture after the moment of giving birth is especially troubling when we think of the 
surrogacy relationship from the perspective of the children born through this process. It is 
increasingly recognised that adopted children need information about their birth parents, that 
they need to be able to see them as real people, and ideally to develop a relationship with 
them. Yet the way commercial surrogacy is organised, it is virtually impossible to sustain that 
sense of the birth mother as a person of equal importance in the world: the process is 
organised in such a way as to write her out of the child’s life. This is not something 
sufficiently captured by the language of either exploitation or commodification, though it 
contains elements of each.   
From the Individual to the Systemic Level 
Critics of surrogacy are often taken to task for a failure to recognise, or even bother to find 
out, how the work is experienced by the surrogates themselves. They are said wrongly to 
presume that all women experience pregnancy as a bonding with the growing child (this is a 
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common critique of Elizabeth Anderson);
39
 or wrongly to presume that the capacity to give 
birth is central to a woman’s identity (recall Pande’s critique of Pateman); or wrongly to 
presume that relinquishing a child after birth will always be traumatic. In my previous writing 
on surrogacy, I made my own, somewhat doubtful, generalisations. I argued that some, at 
least, of the current social division of labour reflects variations in skills and preferences that 
lead us to specialise in different activities, such that even in our deeply inegalitarian world, 
we can tell plausible tales about some divisions of labour that do not depend on one person 
being rich and another poor. I claimed, however, that the appeal to differential skills and 
preferences does not work for surrogacy, hence that this is a division of labour that can only 
be explained by reference to social and gender inequality.  Yet as I knew even at the time of 
writing, this was overstated. It is not entirely absurd to say that some women might have a 
‘preference’ for being pregnant, and might choose this as their occupation even in the 
absence of pressing economic need. Women vary in the ways they experience pregnancy, in 
their sense of who they are, in their capacity for emotional detachment, and when objections 
to commercial surrogacy depend on unsubstantiated claims of a general nature, they are 
inevitably vulnerable to critique. This, indeed, was very much Panitch’s starting point: the 
need to ground any claims about exploitation in what the surrogates themselves say about 
their lives and experiences.  
There is, however, a sense in which the assessment of transnational commercial 
surrogacy is independent of individual experience.  If a surrogate says she feels well paid for 
her work,  we cannot yet take this as definitive evidence that the price is fair, for she may not 
know how much surrogates in other countries are paid, or how much the clients are paying, or 
she may be someone who sets a low value on herself. Similarly, if a commissioning couple 
forms a friendship with a surrogate and takes a genuine interest in her life, this does not yet 
establish that the relationship is an equal one, for the claim about inequality is structural, not 
reducible to individual ‘niceness’. The problem with surrogacy is not just that the women 
may be badly treated, or work in poor conditions, or are paid less than their counterparts 
elsewhere; and the inequality I am claiming in the transaction is not to be understood simply 
in terms of how the various participants feel towards one another. The problems with 
commercial surrogacy have to be understood at a systemic as well as individual level.  
One key component of this is that surrogacy can only be a solution to infertility 
problems within a very narrow range; the recent transformation into a global industry makes 
this even clearer than before. We can envisage a global solution to malaria or HIV/AIDS, one 
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that ultimately aids everyone around the world, but we cannot plausibly represent surrogacy 
as a solution to global problems of childlessness. When poorer women face infertility or 
poorer gay men wish to become parents, the development of surrogacy techniques offers 
them no respite. The opportunities opened up by  these developments are only available to the 
relatively wealthy – and can only be available to that limited few, for there would never be 
enough women of child bearing age in the world willing and able to act as surrogates for all 
the world’s childless. The industry depends, intrinsically not just contingently, on global 
inequalities, both to generate the supply of surrogates and to keep the demand to a 
manageable level. Were the price to drop to a point that made surrogacy a genuine alternative 
to the many millions who face childlessness, it would have to be to a level at which few 
woman would agree to work as a surrogate.
40
 Were the price were to rise to a point where the 
conditions  of employment no longer appear exploitative, this could only further remove the 
possibility of using surrogacy services from the vast majority of the world’s childless people. 
Commercial surrogacy is a luxury good that depends on treating some people’s childlessness 
as a matter of more consequence than that of others. Unlike global solutions to malaria or 
HIV/AIDSs, it can never be generalised.   
Amrita Pande makes a similar point, with a further ironic twist, when she 
describes  
the new subtle form of eugenics whereby the neoliberal notion of consumer 
choice justifies promotion of assisted reproductive services for the rich and, 
at the same time, justifies aggressive anti-natal policies by portraying poor 
people (often in the global south) as strains on the world’s economy and 
environment. Moreover, as the surrogates align their own reproduction, 
through decisions about fertility, sterilization, and abortion, in order to 
(re)produce children of higher classes and privileged nations, they ultimately 
conform to this neoliberal global imperative of reducing the fertility of 
lower-class women in the global south.
41
  
In one poignant illustration, Parvati (not her real name) discovered that she was pregnant with 
what would have been her second child whilst undergoing the medical checks to become a 
surrogate. Though she and her husband wanted a second child, they ‘needed the money more 
than a baby’, and she elected to have an abortion. As one of the oldest surrogates, however, 
she knew this could mean she would never have her own second child. Here, the desire of 
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one couple for a child very directly cancelled the possibility for the other – and did so, not 
because the clients were unkind or consciously rated their own needs above hers, but because 
the arrangement was systemically unequal.  
There are many luxury trades in the world that cannot be generalised: I cannot 
imagine a future world in which everyone can drive an Aston Martin or every student 
receives the one-to-one attention of world ranking academics that supposedly characterises 
studying at Oxford. But these are not goods that are as generally desired as having children, 
nor are they ones whose unequal distribution marks out some people as of lesser significance 
than others.  Having children is also not universally desired, in that not everyone wants to be 
a parent, but it is universal in another sense, in that it cuts across all countries and income 
brackets. And while the owners of Aston Martins or beneficiaries of elite educations 
sometimes convince themselves that they are indeed of superior significance, their high self-
esteem is rarely endorsed by those who ride bicycles or were educated elsewhere. With 
surrogacy, by contrast, the focus on the anguish of infertility and childlessness, combined 
with the impossibility of generalised access to the proposed solution, establishes  a hierarchy 
of significance in which some people’ s pain matters more than the pain of others. 
In making this point, I am shifting the focus of the argument from inequalities in the 
relationship between surrogate, commercial agency, and commissioning couple, to include 
the further inequalities between those able to use surrogacy arrangements and those who will 
never be in a position to do so. This moves us beyond the level of individual experience and 
perception. There is no relationship – or only the most formal of relationships – between 
those able to turn to surrogacy to provide themselves with a child and those with no chance of 
this, and while one can assume that commissioning couples spend quite a lot of time thinking 
about their chosen surrogate, it is unlikely that they give much thought to the many not 
pursuing surrogacy. I am not, to repeat, claiming that they actually think of themselves as 
more important, or consider it desirable that only a small proportion of the childless should 
ever get this opportunity. This part of my argument is systemic, not individual, and does not 
depend for its validity on expressed feelings or views. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have queried the distinction between exploitation and commodification 
critiques, and have argued that both derive their force from notions of what it is to treat others 
as equals. This then blurs the distinction between the two. The further implication, which 
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becomes particularly apparent when we look to the systemic level, is that neither is able, 
either singly or in tandem, fully to capture the challenge posed by the development and 
globalisation of commercial surrogacy. Both exploitation and commodification point to 
harms done to specific individuals. There are indeed such harms, as Vida Panitch among 
others has demonstrated, and in exploring these, it is important to draw on what individuals 
themselves feel about their situation, not presume in advance that we know how they ‘must’ 
feel.  But in analysing why the commercialisation and globalisation of surrogacy is so 
problematic, we should also look to the systemic level, where inequality is built into the 
nature and practice of the industry, and cannot be resolved by improvements in the terms and 
conditions of the trade.  
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